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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Henry Sanchez, Jr., appellant herein, appeals from judgment and sentence 
against him for, Felony, I.C. 37-2732(c)(1), pursuant to his Judgment of Conviction 
thereon. (R. 118-122). 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Appellant Henry Sanchez, Jr. was charged with Possession of 
Methamphetamine, Felony, I.C. 37-2732(c)(1) by way of Complaint filed July 1, 2010. 
(R. 13-14). 
Mr. Sanchez filed a Motion to Suppress and Memorandum in Support on August 
2, 2010, along with a supporting affidavit. (R. 85-89). The District Court, the Honorable 
John K. Butler presiding, held argument on the motion on June 28, 2010. (Tr., pp. 4-26). 
Officer Kenneth Rushing testified that while on patrol, he saw what he thought 
were two juveniles "messing with a car". (Prelim. Tr., p. 5). At the hearing on motion to 
suppress, he testified that as he was driving past a parking lot, he szr.-1 two boys on 
bicycles, who ducked down behind a car. (Tr., p. 20, Lines. 18-19). He also described 
the encounter in his testimony as a "traffic stop". (Tr., p. 18, L. 24 - p. 19, L. 1 ). 
Officer Baker testified at the suppression hearing that he saw two people on 
bicycles near an automobile in a dark parking lot. As he turned around, the individuals 
fled. (Tr., p. 8, L. 24 - p. 19, L. 5). 
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In a memorandum opinion dated July 12, 2010, the district court denied Mr. 
Sanchez's Motion to Suppress. (R. 135-141 ). As stated above, Mr. Sanchez 
subsequently entered his plea, upon which the Court sentenced him. (R. 2C8-215). 
Mr. Sanchez filed a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 (R., 216-
228), which the court denied without hearing. (R., 237-239). Mr. Sanchez timely filed 
his appeal. (R. 240-244). 
11. 
ISSUES 
A. Did the District Court err by denying the Appellant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence? 
8. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a sentence of 
seven years with 2 years fixed, 5 years indeterminate upon Mr. Sanchez following his 
plea of guilty? 
C. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Sanchez's Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence? 
111. 
ARGUMENT 
A The District Court erred by denying the Appellant's Motion to Suppress 
Evidence. 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. The appellate court 
accepts the trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but 
freely reviews the application of constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. 
Watts, 142 Idaho 230, 232, 127 P.3d 133, 135 (2005). 
? 
The Supreme Court has often stated that warrantless searches and seizures are 
per se unreasonable absent consent or exigent circumstances. Coolidge v. New 
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). Both the Idaho and 
Federal Constitutions require a proper warrant to be issued in order to justify a search: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, 
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be s,Jized. Amend. 
IV, U.S. Constitution. 
The Defendant has the initial burden of proof to make a prima facie 
showing of illegality. See, e.g., United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856 (9th Cir. Cal. 
1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1120, 95 S.Ct. 802, 42 L.Ed.2d 820 (1975); United States 
v. Cella, 568 F.2d 1266 (9th Cir. Cal. 1977). Once the Defendant makes this showing, 
the burden shifts to the government to show the existence of some justification of the 
presumptively illegal search and seizure. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 
S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963). 
Further, a seizure occurs and continues when an officer restrains an individual so 
that considering all the circumstances surrounding the encounter, the police conduct 
would communicate to a reasonable person that she is not at liberty w g:) about her 
business. State v. Gutierrez, 137 Idaho 647, 650-51, 51 P.3d 461 (2002) 
A brief encounter between a citizen and a police officer, is governed by Terry v. 
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), under which an officer who has a reasonable, articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot may conduct a brief stop. While "reasonable 
suspicion" is a less demanding standard than probable cause, there must be at least a 
minimal level of objective justification for the stop. A Terry stop must oe based on a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the person in question either has or is about to 
commit a crime. State v. Cox, 136 Idaho 858, 41 P.3d 744 (Ct. App. 2002). 
In this case, Mr. Sanchez was simply in a parking lot near a vehicle. The 
testimony in the record is conclusory at best. No "reasonable, articulable, suspicion" 
was testified to. Rather, the district court relied on the officer's conclusory statement 
that he saw what he thought were two juveniles "messing with a car". {Prelim. Tr., p. 5). 
Inherent in such an analysis is the requirement that there be testimony and 
record sufficient to make such a finding. As stated above, other than the presence of 
the individuals in a parking lot near a car, no articulation of facts dupporting a 
reasonable suspicion occurred. The state did not support the officer's conclusion with 
any facts. Therefore, the record does not support the district court's conclusion that 
there was a sufficient basis for a Terry stop. 
Unlike Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000), here, there was no facts 
regarding any criminal activity on which to base a suspicion. Here, one officer testified 
he "thought" they might be messing with a car, and the other officer testified he 
"thought" they might be burglarizing a car. The officers' subjective thoughts, without any 
testimony regarding independent facts upon which to form a suspicion, do not support 
even a Terry stop type of encounter. 
Likewise, no actual facts regarding the alleged "flight" by Mr. Sanchez were 
testified to. Instead, the Officer Baker simply stated in conclusory fasr,,on that the 
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individuals on bicycles ufled". (Tr., p. 8, L 24 ~ p. 19, L. 5). No other testimony regarding 
the alleged flight exists in the record. The testimony that does exist amounts to one 
sentence which simply states a conclusion. Such a conclusion, without some 
articulation of facts, is not sufficient to justify a detention or seizure. 
In Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), the Supreme Court held that when an 
officer, without reasonable suspicion or probable cause, approaches an individual, the 
individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. Id., dt /498. And any 
"refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of objective 
justification needed for a detention or seizure." Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 437 
(1991 ). 
Likewise in this case, the record contains no articulated facts or evidence upon 
which to base even a Terry stop. Therefore, Mr. Sanchez was fre5e to leave the scene, 
and his leaving, even if in a hurried manner, doe not furnish the minimal level of 
objective justification required for a detention or seizure, 
Once Mr. Sanchez was forced to return to what one officer described as a "traffic 
stop", clearly Mr. Sanchez was seized, and in custody. Again, other than the presence 
in the parking lot, and the fact that Mr. Sanchez had left, no facts are present in the 
record to support any sort of stop or detention. 
There was no testimony of any sort of independent factors constituting probable 
cause or even reasonable suspicion regarding Mr. Sanchez. Therefore the evidence 
obtained from the resulting search of Mr. Sanchez's jacket should have been 
suppressed. 
fi 
Under these facts, the trial court should be reversed, the conviction overturned 
and the matter remanded for further proceedings. 
B. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Sentence Of Seven 
Years, Two Fixed And Five Indeterminate Upon Mr. Sanchez, Following His 
Admission Plea of Guilty. 
Mr. Sanchez's history, and the facts of this case, present mitigating 
circumstances indicating a need for temperance in sentencing. Nevertheless, the 
district court imposed seven years upon Mr. Sanchez. Mr. Sanchez asserts that the 
district court failed to adequately consider the mitigating factors and, thus, abused its 
discretion, considering his personal circumstances. 
Mr. Sanchez asserts that, given any view of the facts, his sentsnce of seven 
years is excessive for his charge. Where a defendant contends that the sentencing 
court imposed an excessively harsh sentence the appellate court conducts an 
independent review of the record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the 
character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 
103 Idaho 771, 653 P.2d 1183 {Ct. App. 1982). The Idaho Supreme Court states: 
the general objectives of sentence review are: 
i) to correct the sentence which is excessive in length, having regard to 
the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection 
of the public interest; 
(ii) to facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender by affording him an 
opportunity to assert grievances he may have regarding his sentence; 
(iii) to promote respect for law by correcting abuses of the se~.tencing 
power and by increasing the fairness of the sentencing process; a, 1d 
(]v) to promote the development and application of criteria for sentencing 
which are both rational and just 
State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141, 144-145, 814 P.2d 401, 404-405 (1991 ), overruled 
on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992), (citing 
State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384-385, 582 P.2d 728, 730-731 (1978) a~d quoting ABA 
Standards Relating to Appellate Review of Sentences at 7 (Approved Draft 1968)). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has further held, '"[w]here a semer:::;e is within 
statutory limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on 
the part of the court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294, 
939 P.2d 1372, 1373 (1997), quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577, 602 P.2d 71, 
75 (1979). Mr. Sanchez does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory 
maximum. Rather, Mr. Sanchez contends that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id., citing State v. 
Broadhead, 120 Idaho 141,145,814 P.2d 401,405 (1991), overruled on other grounds 
by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385, 825 P.2d 482 (1992). The gov~rriing criteria, or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilit,;ltion; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id., quoting State v. Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 
582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). 
Although Mr. Sanchez's history presented mitigating circumstances and reasons 
for mercy, and a recommendation by the prosecutor for probation, the court sentenced 
this very young man on his first felony dui to a seven year unified sentence. Mr. 
Sanchez was at the time of original sentencing an 59 year old man. (PSI p.1 ). He was 
born on (PSI p.1.) He is a father and a grandfather,- (PSI p.4-5.) 
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Additionally, the issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses 
remorse has been addressed in several cases. In State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 824 
P.2d 135 (Ct. App. 1991), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is 
required when the defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his recognition of 
his problem, his willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his 
character." Id. at 209, 824 P.2d at 140. Similarly, the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a 
defendant's term of imprisonment because the defendant expressed regret for what he 
had done. State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595, 651 P.2d 527, 529, (1982). In the 
present case, by the time of sentencing, Mr. Sanchez, indicated remorse by his 
willingness to get treatment and join a mission. (PSI p.9.) 
In light of the facts of the his case and of his personal circumstances, Mr. 
Sanchez asserts that the district court failed to adequately consider the mitigating 
factors, considered improper factors 
C. The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Sanchez Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35 (Rule 35) Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence Because The 
Sentence Was Excessive As Initially Imposed 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency that may 
be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 
Idaho 251,253,869 P.2d 568,570 (Ct.App.1994), citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 
740 P.2d 63 (Ct.App.1987) and State v. Pope, 106 Idaho 447, 680 P.2d 869 
(Ct.App.1984). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are 
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was 
reasonable." Id., citing Pope, 106 Idaho a 450, 680 P.2d at 872. "If the sentence was 
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not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in 
view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id., citing 
State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 822 P .2d 1011 (Ct.App.1991 ). 
Here, new information concerning Mr. Sanchez was provided from him directly in 
his motion. (R., 216-228). The new information was that the longer fixed portion of the 
sentence was preventing Mr. Sanchez from entering the therapeutic community as 
otherwise recommended by the district court. 
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the 
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency that may 
be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent, 125 
Idaho 251, 253, 869 P.2d 568, 570 (Ct.App.1994), citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21, 
740 P.2d 63 (Ct.App.1987) and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447 .. 680 P.2d 869 
(Ct.App.1984 ). "The criteria for examining rulings denying the requested leniency are 
the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence was 
reasonable." Id., citing Lopez, 106 Idaho a 450, 680 P.2d at 872. "If th6 Sf'Jntence was 
not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive in 
view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction. Id., citing 
State v. Hernandez, 121 Idaho 114, 822 P.2d 1011 (Ct.App.1991 ). 
It is Mr. Sanchez's position that because the district court originally 
recommended that he be placed in the therapeutic community, and because the length 
of the sentence was preventing such placement, failure to reduce his sentence is an 
abuse of discretion. 
Therefore, he respectfully contends that the district court should have reduced 
his sentence pursuant to the Rule 35 motion because the sentence was excessive as 
originally imposed, and because the length of the sentence was preventing him from 
entering the therapeutic community. His further arguments in support of this assertion 
are found in section ll(C) above, and need not be repeated. They are incorporated 
herein by reference. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Sanchez respectfully requests that this Court reverse the trisl court's denial 
of his motion to suppress, that his conviction also be reversed, and the matter 
remanded for further proceedings. Mr. Sanchez further respectfully requests that if this 
Court does not grant the afore requested relief, that this Court reduce his sentence as it 
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district 
court for a new ser.tencing hearing. Alternatively, he requests that the order denying his 
Rule 35 motion be vacated and the case remanded to the district court for further 
proceedings. 
DATED this 17th day of February, 2012. 
UJ()__ 
STEf>HEN6. THOMPSON 
Appellate Public Defender 
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